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Abstract
The extensive use of smartphones and wearable devices
has facilitated many useful applications. For example,
with Global Positioning System (GPS)-equipped smart
and wearable devices, many applications can gather,
process, and share rich metadata, such as geolocation,
trajectories, elevation, and time. For example, fitness
applications, such as Strava and Runkeeper, utilize in-
formation for activity tracking, and have recently wit-
nessed a boom in popularity. Those trackers have their
own web platforms, and allow users to share activities
on such platforms, or even with other social network
platforms. To preserve privacy of users while allowing
sharing, those platforms allow users to disclose partial
information, such as the elevation profile for an activity,
which supposedly will not leak the location trajectory.
In this work we examine the extent to which publicly
available elevation profiles can be used to predict the lo-
cation trajectory of users. To tackle this problem, we de-
vise three threat settings under which the city, borough,
or even a route can be predicted. Those threat settings
define the amount of information available to the adver-
sary to launch the prediction attacks. Establishing that
simple features of elevation profiles, e.g., spectral fea-
tures, are insufficient, we devise both natural language
processing (NLP)-inspired text-like representation and
computer vision-inspired image-like representation of
elevation profiles, and we convert the problem at hand
into text and image classification problem. We use both
traditional machine learning- and deep learning-based
techniques, and achieve a prediction success rate rang-
ing from 59.59% to 95.83%. The findings are alarming,
and highlight that sharing information such as elevation
profile may have significant privacy risks.
Introduction
From smartphones to wearable devices, various types of In-
ternet of Things (IoT) devices are equipped with Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS), accelerometers and gyroscopes to
allow applications to function or to present a better user ex-
perience by making use of geodata, such as location and el-
evation information. Specifically, fitness applications which
run on smartphones and smartwatches use these systems to
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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Figure 1: Survey results for understanding users behavior:
(a) starting point statistics, (b) end point statistics, and (c)
not sharing location information implies privacy. While 90%
of the 60 participants indicated their start of activity is either
home, school, or work, an overwhelming 98% of the partic-
ipant indicated those to be the end point of their activities.
collect spatial, temporal, and activity-specific information to
analyze, summarize and visualize users’ activities. By an-
alyzing each activity, many of those applications even de-
liver personalized motivations and challenges for users to
meet their goals. Using social media support of these appli-
cations for sharing updates about users’ activities, includ-
ing training routes and elevation profiles for the routes taken
for the activity (e.g., walking, running, climbing, cycling),
users can have positive behavioural changes through a more
active lifestyle motivated by competitions with friends and
acquaintances (P Higgins 2015).
Despite the broad set of advantages geodata has, geodata
usage and uncontrolled sharing can pose a significant pri-
vacy risk which can be exploited in multiple attacks, includ-
ing stalking (Polakis et al. 2015) and cybercasing (Friedland
and Sommer 2010). For example, with the large amount of
geo-tagged data, including text, images, and videos, cyber-
casing allows a significant attack vector to criminals and
maliciously motivated individuals. Geo-tagged photos that
are frequently posted on image sharing websites, such as
Flickr, or second-hand sale websites, such as craigslist, may
put owners of those images at risk. For example, geo-tagged
images posted on sales websites may reveal the location of
the advertised product, leading to trespassing or even theft.
Geodata recorded by fitness applications are indeed impor-
tant and valuable not only for the operation of those applica-
tions but also as an avenue for launching attacks on users
by breaching their privacy, since sensitive information of
users such as house or workplace location can be easily in-
ferred from such data. To support this argument, we con-
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ducted a survey with 60 participants who regularly train out-
doors, with the results of the survey summarized in Figure
1. The survey results reveal that 58.62% of the participants
start their training from their houses, 25.86% start from their
school and 3.45% start from their workplace, and, almost
70% of the participants finish their training at their houses.
To protect such sensitive information, different fitness appli-
cations provide different mechanisms to keep parts of work-
out records private, as some of which could be seen from
Table 1. Although it is possible not to share exact route by
using those mechanisms, people still may want to share el-
evation profile to show the roughness of the route they took
as a measure of their workout. However, is the elevation pro-
file of an activity enough to reveal some information about
the activity? Interestingly, our survey results suggest that the
surveyed subjects believe (or at least suspect, as with the
“maybe” answers) that not sharing the exact location infor-
mation (map trajectory) is sufficient to ensure privacy. In this
paper, we argue that an approximate location at different lev-
els of location granularity could still be revealed from eleva-
tion profile information, which are typically shared.
Contributions. In this paper, we contribute the following:
• We translated the problem into text classification and im-
age classification problems by encoding the elevation sig-
nals as strings and visualizing the elevation signals as im-
ages to employ the common approaches for solving image
and text classification problems,
• We investigated the possible attack surface for the prob-
lem by introducing three different threat models, which
we later used to evaluate the success of our approaches by
simulating our methods considering each threat model,
• We proved that location information can be predicted
from elevation profile using different machine/deep learn-
ing methods with accuracy in range 59.59% - 95.83% at
different resolutions as our results showed.
Background
Fitness Applications
Fitness applications available for smartphones allow users
to track their workout history and statistics. Some fitness ap-
plications have social network capabilities, as shown in Ta-
ble 1, allowing users to share workout summaries, which is
known to motivate users and their social network connec-
tions (P Higgins 2015). Moreover, among widely used fit-
ness applications, Strava and Runkeeper have additional pri-
vacy settings for posts, allowing users to hide actual routes
while sharing only the elevation profiles. Given its popular-
ity, Strava is the application we consider in this work.
Strava. Strava allows users to track and optionally share
their outdoor workouts. Although the total number of users
is unknown, Strava is expanding by 1 million users every 45
days and 8 million activities are recorded each week. In our
study, we used the public Strava Development API to mine
Strava Segments which are user-created training routes, and
typically used for competition among users. The main ad-
vantages of segments are as follows. First, since segments
are created for competition, the routes are frequently used
Table 1: Fitness applications and their features, including ex-
ercise tracking (ET), ability to share to social media (SS),
social networking capabilities in the service (SNS), privacy
records (PR), and user blocking capability (BU).
Service ET SS SNS PR BU
Strava X X X X X
Runtastic X X X X
Runkeeper X X X X
Nike+ Running X X X X
MapMyRun X X X X
by users, increasing the segment’s likelihood of occurrence
within a set of routes. Second, segments may include chal-
lenging terrain, possibly with significant change in eleva-
tion. We hypothesize that a rich profile of change in eleva-
tion within a route can be an identifying feature of such a
route, which we explore and confirm in this work.
Privacy Breach Incidents in Strava
There has been a lot of privacy incidents concerning loca-
tion data, particularly data obtained from Strava, which we
review in the following to contextualize our work.
Global Heatmap. Strava collects users’ public data and
publishes heatmap of the aggregates to highlight routes fre-
quented by users. Although the aggregates in the heatmap
do not explicitly contain any identity information, activities
in desolate places revealed location of many U.S. military
bases, which is sensitive information.
Deanonymization Through Strava Segments. Strava
heatmap provides anonymous public data. It is shown that
a dedicated adversary can deanonymize heatmap to find out
users who ran in a specified route (Loughran 2019). For ex-
ample, by selecting a route from the heatmap, a registered
user can manually create a GPS eXchange (GPX) track file
and a segment using it on Strava. Consequently, the top-10
users grouped by gender and age who previously ran that
route are shown on the leaderboard, thus identifying them.
Bicycle Theft. Users on Strava can share their equipment in-
cluding expensive bicycles and shoes, along with the routes
frequented, making them a target to robbery. As a result, one
victim claimed losses of around 16,000 USD.
Attack on Privacy Zone. Privacy zones are used to obfus-
cate the exact starting and ending point of a route. In a recent
study, Hassan, Hussain, and Bates (2018) were able to reveal
the exact starting and ending point of a route that utilizes the
privacy zone feature. They also claimed that around 95% of
the users are at risk of revealing their location information.
Threat Models & Approach Overview
We outline the threat models under which this study is con-
ducted. We describe three models under which the location
privacy from publicly shared elevation profiles is breached.
We then review our approach, including a pipeline that con-
sists of data collection and preprocessing, feature extraction,
and multi-class classification for location trajectory identifi-
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cation. We briefly discuss the phases of our pipeline, each of
which is explained in details in implementation section.
Threat Models
Our study utilizes three threat models: TM-1, TM-2, and
TM-3, which we outline below with their justification. The
adversarial capabilities in TM-1 are greater than in TM-2
and TM-3, making it more a restrictive (powerful) model.
1 TM-1. In TM-1, we assume an adversary with some
records of the workout history of a target user, and the goal
of the adversary is to identify the location of the target user
from the shared elevation profiles. TM-1 is justified by mul-
tiple plausible scenarios in practice. For example, such an
adversary might have been a previous social network con-
nection of the targeted user that was later blocked. In such
a scenario, the adversary may have such previous work-
out records of the target from which the adversary may at-
tempt to de-anonymize the target’s activities. Another exam-
ple might include group activities, in which two individuals
(i.e., the adversary and target) may have shared the same
route at some point. In either case, by knowing the target’s
history, the adversary’s goal in this model is to identify re-
cent whereabouts from publicly shared elevation profiles in
workout summaries, thus breaching the target’s privacy.
2 TM-2. In TM-2, we assume an adversary with access
to limited information such as the city in which the target
lives. Such information is easily accessible from public pro-
file summaries, athlinks.com, public records, etc. The adver-
sary’s goal in TM-2 is to find out which region or part of a
given city the target’s activities are associated with. The TM-
2 use scenario may include a targeted user sharing private
activities, in which the route is hidden while the elevation
profile is shown. The adversary, knowing the city where the
target lives, would want to identify the region (e.g., borough
in the city) associated with the user’s activity.
3 TM-3. In TM-3, we assume an adversary trying to iden-
tify the target user’s city using only publicly shared elevation
profiles. We assume, however, the adversary has the abil-
ity to profile the elevation of cities, with information that is
easily obtained from public sources (e.g., Google maps and
Strava API). The use scenario of TM-3 may be used as a
stepping stone towards launching the attack scenario in TM-
2 upon narrowing down the search space to a city.
Approach Overview
Data Collection and Preprocessing. We collected three
datasets with varying and rich characteristics, namely 1) raw
Strava data collected from Strava’s users, 2) mined Strava
segments grouped at city-level, and 3) mined Strava seg-
ments grouped at borough-level. For the raw dataset, we col-
lected bulk raw activities of Strava users and converted those
activities to our intermediate format, the GPS Exchange For-
mat (GPX). Then, we parsed the GPX files and manually
labeled them according to the latitude and longitude infor-
mation included within each file. For the second dataset, we
mined segment routes from Strava using Strava development
API specifying the location boundaries, i.e., the class label
of the mined data, and augmented each segment route with
the corresponding elevation profiles obtained from Google
Maps Elevation API. Finally, the borough-level dataset is
constructed in a similar manner as in the city-level dataset.
In preprocessing, the collected datasets are transformed into
text-like and image-like representations. For text-like repre-
sentation, we discretized the elevation signals and computed
the minimum required word size. We then created a mapping
between each unique discrete value and a string. By map-
ping the string correspondents to the unique discrete values,
we encoded the elevation profiles in text. Finally, we form a
vocabulary from the text sequences of each dataset using the
n-grams. To obtain image-like representation, we converted
the elevation profiles to a fixed-sized line graph where the
x-axis stands for time and y-axis stands for the elevation val-
ues. The lines in the graphs are also colored to represent the
elevation interval in which the elevation profiles range.
Feature Extraction. The classification algorithm operates
on high quality and discriminative features, obtained from
the representations of elevation profiles. For feature extrac-
tion, we utilize Natural Language Processing (NLP) and
computer vision approaches. To employ NLP approaches,
using previously obtained vocabulary, we represent each el-
evation profile as a feature vector based on the frequency of
the vocabulary in the text-like representation (bag-of-words
vector). To employ computer vision approaches, we utilize
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) over image-like rep-
resentations. The optimal features of an image-like repre-
sentation are efficiently extracted by the convolutional and
pooling layers in the CNN architecture.
Multi-class Classification. We use various machine and
deep learning models for classification including Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest Classifica-
tion (RFC) as machine learning approaches, and Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) and Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) as deep learning approaches.
Implementation Details
The implementation details of data collection, preprocess-
ing, feature extraction and multi-class classification are ad-
dressed in the following subsections.
Data Collection and Preprocessing
In this study, we use three datasets: the raw dataset, the city-
level dataset, and the borough-level dataset. The raw dataset
is retrieved from Strava users who have duplicate samples
from similar trajectories in their profile. The raw dataset of-
fers a dense and thorough coverage for regions frequented
by users; those regions are used as class labels. The city- and
borough-level datasets are created from scratch, and do not
have any duplicate samples with similar trajectories. Both
provide a spatial and comprehensive coverage of cities and
boroughs. After data collection, data is preprocessed accord-
ing to the feature extraction methods. We provide details on
each dataset and the preprocessing method below.
Data Collection For the raw dataset, we collected data
from Strava users whose activities are archived and can be
downloaded through the Strava web interface. First, the raw
data is converted to GPX format. For labelling, all samples
are traversed, and the maximum and minimum coordinates
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Figure 2: An illustration of the tight rectangle encapsulating
an example route.
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Figure 3: An illustration of data mining pipeline.
of each sample are fetched. Each sample route is encap-
sulated with a tight rectangle whose top right (North East)
and bottom left (South West) corners are computed from the
maximum and the minimum coordinates of the route as il-
lustrated in Figure 2. To classify the samples, each rectangle
encapsulating the route is compared with the previously cre-
ated regions. If the Euclidean distance between the center of
the rectangle and the center of the existing region does not
exceed a predetermined threshold, the rectangle and its cor-
responding sample are labeled with a unique identity of the
region. If there is no region includes the route, a new region
is created. After the classification phase is done, we man-
ually convert the labels from unique region IDs to region
names by looking up where the coordinates of the regions
are on world map. The final sample size distribution of raw
dataset is shown in Table 2.
For the city-level dataset, we mined publicly available
Strava segments using the “explore segments” function of
the Strava API. The overall procedure consists of 3 steps as
illustrated in Figure 3. First, we defined the cities of interest,
which are also the class labels. For each city C, we defined
rectangle boundaries, B. Since the “explore segment” func-
tion returns the top-10 segments in a given boundary, we di-
vided B into smaller regions, each denoted by ri, and com-
puted their boundaries, each denoted by bi, to obtain more
information about the cityC. Then, for each bi, we requested
the segment information from the Strava API and received
the geolocation polyline path, pathji where j ∈ [1, 10], of
the top-10 segments included in bi. Finally, we requested
the elevation profile elevji for each path
j
i from the Google
Maps Elevation API. The sample size distribution of city-
level dataset can be found in Table 3.
Table 2: Raw dataset sample size distribution.
Regions Sample Size
Washington DC 366
Florida 232
New York City 120
California 18
Table 3: City-level dataset sample size distribution.
Regions Sample Size
New York City 2437
Washington DC 2129
San Francisco 743
Colorado Springs 369
Minneapolis 363
Los Angeles 280
New Jersey 266
Duluth 156
Miami 94
Tampa 83
For the borough-level dataset, we applied a similar mining
procedure as at the city-level, using the borough boundaries
instead of the city boundaries. Table 4 shows the sample size
distribution of the borough-level dataset.
Preprocessing We transform the samples to text- and
image-like representations to facilitate feature extraction.
Text-like Representation. To represent data as text-like
contents, we use four steps, as in Figure 4: discretization,
word size decision, text encoding, and vocabulary creation.
1 In the discretization step, the original elevation signal
is discretized along the y-axis, which represents the eleva-
tion values to avoid possible overhead by small differences
in the precision causing a longer string correspondences and,
consequently, longer vocabulary and sparse feature vectors.
The discretization is done as follows. Let eji be the i-th el-
evation value in j-th sample. The discretization functions
are defined as f(eji ) = beji c and f(eji ) = be
j
i×103c
103 , where
the first function is used for processing the raw dataset and
the second function is used for processing the city-level and
borough-level datasets. Since the raw dataset is dense in
terms of sampling rate, using the floor function is enough to
represent the routes. However, as the city-level and borough-
level datasets are already sparse, losing information is unde-
sired, so we used the second function to represent the eleva-
tions that differ in up to 3 decimal digits precision.
2 For word size decision, we use w = logl c, where w
is the word size, l is the length of the alphabet, and c is the
number of unique value occurrences in the given signals.
3 For text encoding, each unique value in all the discrete
signals is mapped to a unique string with length w and each
sample signal is encoded by referring to the string corre-
spondences of each value in the discrete signal and concate-
nating these strings to construct a long text, i.e., corpus.
4
Table 4: Borough-level dataset sample size distribution.
Cities Regions Sample Size
Los Angeles
(LA)
Downtown 280
Santa Monica 128
Chinatown 46
Beverly Hills 38
Miami
(MIA)
Downtown 67
Miami Beach 44
Virginia Key 18
New Jersey
(NJ)
Jersey City 266
West New York 23
Newark 28
New York City
(NYC)
Manhattan 2437
Queens 353
Brooklyn(South) 239
Brooklyn(North) 205
Bronx 142
Staten Island 119
San Francisco
(SF)
South West 743
South East 144
North West 130
North East 86
Washington DC
(WDC)
District of Columbia 2129
Baltimore 218
4 To create our vocabulary, we consider the corpus cre-
ated from all encoded signals regardless of labels. Each line
in the corpus represents a sample signal, and each word in a
line represents the text correspondence of an elevation value
in the sample signal. We build a vocabulary from the unique
word-based n-grams of the document. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 5, a window with size W = w × n is slided through-
out the corpus and each window content is appended to the
vocabulary set. Since the vocabulary set does not contain
duplicate entries by definition, we constructed the vocabu-
lary consisting of unique n-grams of the given dataset after
traversing the corpus by n times with different window sizes.
Image-like Representation. In image-like transformation,
the elevation signals are drawn as line graphs. To draw a
line graph, the maximum and minimum values for y-axis
are set to be the extremes of each elevation signal, and the
lines are colored to encode the value interval in which eleva-
tion signal ranges. This method has multiple advantages over
other methods—e.g., the alterations of an elevation signal
are more visible, and the method results in an efficient uti-
lization of the feature space—which we examined to reach
this design choice, but we omit due to lack of space. We use
200 elevation values for each, obtained by dividing the ele-
vation signal into equal-sized parts.
Feature Extraction
To classify elevation profiles accurately, we extract discrim-
inative features from the elevation profile representations.
Discretization
Word Size 
Decision
𝒘
Text 
Encoding
… ABNTJKHQ …
Vocabulary 
Creation
[ AB, BN, … , ABNT, …,
ABNTJK, … ,ABNTJKHQ ]
Corpus
Vocabulary
Original Signal Discrete Signal
Figure 4: Illustration of the flow of text-like preprocessing.
The signal is discretized by eliminating the small elevation
fluctuations. The discretized signal is also used for deciding
the word size of the encoding. The discrete signal is then
encoded in text and a vocabulary is built.
𝐰 = 𝟐
𝐧 = 𝟐
𝐖 = 𝐰× 𝐧 = 𝟒
𝐰
Figure 5: Illustration of bi-gram creation where the word
size is w = 2 and window size is W = 4.
Text-like. In text-like feature extraction, words and non-
overlapping occurrences of word sequences are counted, a
feature vector for each sample is created with each unique
word sequence count being a feature. Finally, the feature
vectors are normalized where each feature represents the
probability of occurrence of each word in the given sample.
When the dataset is large and diverse, the vocabulary
and, consequently, the feature vectors becomes too large and
sparse to do computations with. In feature selection phase,
in case the length of feature vectors are too long, some rarely
occurred features from vocabulary are discarded according
to the specified feature frequency threshold. Features are or-
dered by term frequency across the corpus and the features
whose term frequency is under the specified threshold are
discarded and a new vocabulary is created.
Image-like. Since we use CNN for images, it is unnecessary
to explicitly extract features, since the convolutional layer
kernels do that already by learning the filters optimally and
efficiently. Therefore, the actual feature extraction mecha-
nism is discussed in the context of classification.
Multi-Class Classification
For classification, SVM, RFC, MLP, and CNN are used.
SVM. We use the standard SVM, where the objective is
to find the best hyperplane separating classes from one an-
other. We use the linear kernel SVM, which is appropriate
for multi-dimensional data (Maglogiannis et al. 2007).
RFC. We utilized the standard RFC, with 100 trees, and a
majority voting is taken over the outcomes of those trees.
MLP. We use the standard MLP with 100 hidden layers and
Adam solver (Kingma and Ba 2014) for weight optimiza-
tion, since it is claimed to work well for large feature space.
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Figure 6: The CNN architecture used for classification. The
input image is passed to a CONV layer. The output is then
forwarded to the MAXPOOL layer to fetch the most impor-
tant feature in a kernel. The data is then passed through fol-
lowing CONV and MAXPOOL layers. The output retrieved
from the last MAXPOOL layer is flattened to be passed to a
FCON layer whose output is the class probabilities.
MLP is shown to outperform the decision trees (Lim, Loh,
and Shih 2000; Eklund 2002).
CNN. Figure 6 illustrates the employed CNN architecture.
Two consecutive convolution layers (CONV) are used along
with the ReLU activation function and MAX pooling layers
(MAXPOOL) before a fully connected layer (FCON). For
both of the convolution layers, kernel, stride and padding
sizes are decided as 5, 1 and 2 respectively. The distinc-
tive features are selected at the max pooling layers with ker-
nel and stride size of 2, which reduce the dimensions from
(32x32) to (8x8) at two passes. The loss is calculated by
Cross Entropy Loss function. For optimizing the parameters,
the Adam optimizer is used.
Evaluation, Results, and Discussion
We performed evaluations for each dataset and threat mod-
els. First, we performed evaluations with text-like represen-
tation. For TM-1, we performed experiments using 5- and
10-fold cross-validation methods and by fixing the dimen-
sion of n-grams to 8 on the raw dataset with SVM, MLP
and RFC techniques. For TM-2, we tried to find the borough
information of a given elevation profile whose city informa-
tion is known. For this experiment, we use 10-fold cross val-
idation, n = 8 for the n-gram, and SVM, MLP and RFC are
employed. For TM-3, we use the same settings as in TM-2.
The raw dataset contains overlapped and repetitive samples
by nature. In the Simulations subsection, we simulated the
same behaviour on the mined datasets and performed the
same evaluations for comparison.
For evaluations using image-like representations, we em-
ployed three methods in CNN: unweighted loss function,
weighted loss function and fine-tuning. In the unweighted
and weighted loss function evaluations, we split the test
data from the dataset by considering the sample size of the
classes; we assigned probabilities for each class consider-
ing the inverse proportion to its size and then randomly se-
lect test data with the associated probabilities. In fine-tuning
evaluations, we performed a 10-fold validation at the last
round where all the classes have the same sample size.
Table 5: TM-1 evaluation on raw dataset. Prediction ac-
curacy (%) with different configurations. 4-class = [Wash-
ington DC, Florida, New York City, California], 3-class =
[Washington DC, Florida, New York City], 2-class = [Wash-
ington DC, Florida]. 5-f: 5-fold cross-validation. 10-f: 10-
fold cross-validation. C: the number of classes in the classi-
fication. S: sample size of each class.
SVM RFC MLP
C S 5-f 10-f 5-f 10-f 5-f 10-f
2 232 97.8 97.8 96.5 97.2 98.0 98.5
3 120 98.3 98.5 96.3 97.0 97.4 97.6
4 18 86.8 87.5 91.0 94.4 93.0 95.8
Text-like Data Evaluation
1 TM-1. We trained and tested models with the raw dataset.
As shown in Table 2, the raw dataset has unbalanced sample
size across classes. To mitigate bias, we use the same sam-
ple size for each class and change the number of classes at
each step. The accuracy results are shown in Table 5. Due to
the limited number of samples, the accuracy of 4-class clas-
sification is lower than 3- and 2-class classification. We ob-
serve a higher accuracy with k=10 than when k=5 in the k-
fold cross-validation, perhaps due to the large training data
capturing the population’s distribution in the first case than
in the latter. The results show 95.83% accuracy with MLP
and 4-class classification. With 3-class classification, we ob-
tained 98.51% accuracy with SVM. With 2-class classifica-
tion, we obtained 98.49% accuracy with MLP.
Since the raw dataset is compiled from actual users, ex-
hibiting mobility patterns, about 35% of the routes are over-
lapped. In a repetitive and overlapped setting, both training
and testing splits may contain similar patterns leading to the
high accuracy scores. The results prove that a targeted attack
on a person whose activity history is known will be success-
ful with accuracy between 84.80% and 98.51%.
2 TM-2. While evaluating TM-2, the borough-level dataset
is used. A model is created for each of the cities, Los An-
geles, Miami, New Jersey, New York City, San Francisco,
and Washington DC, by labeling the data as the name of
the corresponding borough and evaluated separately. Figure
7 shows the accuracy, precision, recall and F1 scores of the
each model in bar charts. All of the accuracy scores of the
models are above 55% while precision, recall and F1 scores
are varying across each model. The main justification for this
is that since there is no overlapped or repetitive routes among
the mined segments in borough-level dataset, and the eleva-
tion differences and elevation sequences are not distinctive
enough within a city to decide in which borough is the given
test data is. This fact also clarifies the difference between
the results of TM-1 and TM-2. The results of the simulated
behaviour will be discussed in the simulations subsection.
2 TM-3. In TM-3 evaluations, due to sample size differ-
ences across the labels in city-level dataset, we followed
the same procedure in TM-1 evaluations. A fixed number
of samples was randomly selected from each class for train-
ing and testing. Table 6 shows the results of the evaluation,
where we employed 10-fold cross-validation and averaged
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Figure 7: Accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score of TM-2 evaluation with different classification techniques.
Table 6: TM-3 evaluation on city-level dataset. Prediction
accuracy (A), recall (R), F1 score (F1) with different clas-
sification techniques and sample size. C column stands for
indicating the number of classes in the classification and S
column shows sample size of each class.
SVM RFC MLP
C S A R F1 A R F1 A R F1
3 743 80.0 69.8 70.2 79.1 68.4 68.4 80.9 71.2 71.6
5 362 90.7 77.7 78.4 89.4 74.8 76.0 90.5 77.4 78.4
7 266 90.7 66.7 66.5 89.0 61.1 61.0 90.0 64.3 64.4
8 155 91.9 68.6 68.5 88.9 57.0 60.3 90.9 65.1 64.5
10 82 93.9 70.2 70.4 92.4 58.1 57.5 92.9 63.7 63.3
results of the 10 folds. Per the reported results, we were able
to predict the city of an elevation profile among 10 cities
with an accuracy of 93.9%, among 8 cities with an accu-
racy of 91.93%, among 7 cities with an accuracy of 90.67%,
among 5 cities with an accuracy of 90.71%, and among 3
cities with an accuracy of 80.86%. The success of the city-
level estimations when compared to the borough-level esti-
mations is based on the elevation range and sequence dif-
ferences across cities, which is reasonable, even though the
dataset is mined in a similar fashion as in the borough-level
dataset. This mining indicates that city-level dataset also
does not contain comprehensive, repetitive and overlapped
samples. The results of the simulated evaluation will be dis-
cussed in the Simulations subsection.
Simulations The mined datasets do not contain over-
lapped or duplicate samples as in the raw dataset. In this
evaluation, we simulated overlapped mined datasets and per-
formed evaluations under the same threat models.
Simulation of TM-2. For the city-level estimation evalua-
tions, we rebuilt a simulation dataset with 30 - 34% overlap
ratio for each region within the cities. The same evaluation
procedures are then followed as the original mined dataset,
which is 10-fold cross validation with fixed n-grams size of
8. Figure 8 shows comparison between the results of MLP
classification, confirming our previous hypothesis that hav-
ing overlapped route samples would increase the accuracy.
Since the mined dataset is not specific to any target user’s
behaviour, it is anticipated to result in less accuracy than the
TM-1 evaluation accuracy scores.
Simulation of TM-3. For TM-3’s simulated evaluations, we
rebuilt a simulation dataset with 35% overlap ratio for each
city and performed the same evaluation with 10-fold cross
Table 7: TM-3 evaluation on city-level dataset when 35%
overlap is introduced. Prediction accuracy (A), recall (R),
F1 score (F1) with different configurations. C column stands
for indicating the number of classes in the classification and
S column shows sample size of each class.
SVM RFC MLP
C S A R F1 A R F1 A R F1
3 966 91.7 82.7 82.8 89.0 77.8 79.1 92.4 84.0 84.1
5 470 94.6 81.6 81.2 93.7 78.7 78.4 95.6 85.0 84.7
7 338 93.6 72.1 72.5 92.4 68.4 68.8 93.9 73.4 73.4
8 202 94.7 75.4 74.9 93.2 67.8 66.9 94.6 74.9 74.2
10 107 94.4 71.4 72.5 93.6 67.7 66.9 93.6 68.9 69.8
validation and 8-grams. Table 7 shows the results. By com-
paring Table 6 to Table 7, we notice that the accuracy, recall,
precision, and F1 scores have increased for all classification
techniques as expected. The improvements prove our previ-
ous hypothesis that having similar patterns in a dataset af-
fects the success of the attack.
Image-like Data Evaluations
Dealing with Unbalanced Dataset. The original datasets
are unbalanced and there are various methods to deal
with unbalanced datasets, including downsampling, over-
sampling, and creating synthetic samples from existing ones.
Among these methods, downsampling and oversampling are
the easiest ones to explore, although downsampling leads
to losing great amount of data and oversampling rises the
chances of getting lower accuracy as the misclassified dupli-
cated samples increases the false ratio.
Weighted Loss Function. For the unbalanced dataset, we
utilized a weighted loss function while training the CNN and
used all the data in the dataset. By assigning a class weight
that is inversely proportional to the sample size of the class,
we signify samples of small classes while calculating the
loss, thus their effect does not easily wear off.
Fine-Tuning with Different Samples. Fine-tuning is a
common technique in deep learning, and is used for re-
training a complex pretrained model with another dataset. To
address the unbalanced dataset, we take advantage of fine-
tuning in a different manner. Namely, we introduced rounds
and created a set of small datasets from the unbalanced
datasets for each round. As illustrated in Figure 9, several
small and balanced datasets are created by randomly select-
ing samples. For each consecutive rounds, samples of one or
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Figure 8: Comparison of the TM-2 simulated dataset evaluation accuracy scores by using Multi-Layer Perceptron classification
and the original dataset evaluation accuracy scores by using Multi-Layer Perceptron classification.
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Figure 9: An illustration of round creation from an unbal-
anced dataset of 3 classes.
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Figure 10: An illustration of the fine-tuning pipeline for an
unbalanced dataset of 3 classes.
more classes are discarded, and the round dataset is created
from the remaining classes. After round dataset creation, the
model is trained with the round dataset that contains the least
number of classes, i.e., the lattermost created round dataset.
At each step, the model is re-trained using the same or differ-
ent hyperparameters until all the rounds expire. The dataset
ordering of the rounds are reversed, since the impact of the
smallest dataset would wear off if the model is trained with
the same order of round dataset creation, which conflicts
with the whole idea. As illustrated in Figure 10, while re-
training, the parameters of the previous model are passed to
the model of the next round. The hyperparameters of each
round can be tuned accordingly. For instance, for the last
round, where we include all of the classes, the learning rate
can be reduced in order to find the loss minima.
To evaluate our attacks on the image-like data, the ele-
vation profiles are converted into a dataset of images and
rounds using the configurations and steps discussed above.
Table 8 highlights the maximum achieved prediction accu-
racy along with comparisons among methods.
Weighted vs. Unweighted Loss Function. To observe the
impact of the weighted loss function, we conducted evalu-
ations without giving any weight to the classes in the loss
function while using an unbalanced dataset. We note that
Table 8: Comparison of maximum achieved accuracy across
different methods. The Unweighted Loss(UW) column is
not considered while deciding the maximum accuracy, as the
results are biased. The maximum accuracy of each evalua-
tion is written bold, the results that are not considered are
written italic. Location abbreviations are in Table 4.
Text-like Image-like
Methods DS UWL(biased) WL FT
TM-1 95.83 96.98 95.23 87.93
TM-2: LA 65.13 68.85 68.39 63.63
TM-2: MIA 68.65 88.96 86.80 62.50
TM-2: NJ 63.52 93.45 79.42 57.14
TM-2: NYC 78.85 74.20 79.37 72.79
TM-2: SF 64.52 67.20 78.70 65.38
TM-2: WDC 60.79 62.79 70.28 71.50
TM-3 93.90 92.51 92.82 89.00
the unweighted loss function evaluation results are biased
due to the unbalanced dataset. Table 8 shows the maxi-
mum achieved accuracy for each dataset and method. Even
though the weighted loss function evaluation results are bi-
ased, which seems successful in outputting the largest class
used during training and testing, the biased results remain
behind 4 evaluations out of 8. For the remaining evaluations,
and except TM-2: NJ, the difference between the results is
insignificant. When the biased results are excluded for TM-
2 evaluations, the weighted loss function performed better
than text-like and fine-tuning methods. However, in TM-1
and TM-3, the accuracy scores between methods are consid-
erably close. Thus, we conclude the weighted loss function
improved the prediction performance primarily for TM-2.
Fine-tuning. Round datasets are created from the original
data. For TM-1, with 4 classes, 3 rounds are created. For
TM-3, with 10 classes, 5 rounds were created by eliminating
1, 2, 1 and 2 classes at each round, respectively. The dataset
of TM-2 can be considered as a compilation of the dataset
of 6 cities: Los Angeles (3 rounds), Miami (3 rounds), New
Jersey (2 rounds), New York City (4 rounds), San Francisco
(2 rounds), and Washington DC (1 round). Even though the
main idea is using all the data we have, we decided to down-
sample the classes with large sample size. For instance, in
the evaluation of TM-2: New York City, the biggest class
has 5,455 samples where the second biggest class has 960
8
Table 9: The fine-tuning results for TM-1 and TM-3 as the
epoch size changes.
TM-1 TM-3
Epoch Size 500 1000 2000 500 1000 2000
Accuracy 79.3 87.9 82.7 86.0 89.0 87.8
Recall 55.8 67.5 63.1 29.7 45.3 38.9
Specificity 86.3 92.6 88.4 92.2 93.9 93.2
F1 Score 58.6 68.2 63.3 36.2 45.4 41.1
Table 10: The fine-tuning results for TM-2 as the epoch size
is 1000 and learning rate is 0.001 for all rounds.
LA MIA NJ NYC SF WDC
Accuracy 63.6 62.5 57.1 72.8 65.4 71.5
Recall 28.0 25.6 40.0 18.1 30.7 73.2
Specificity 75.8 75.9 66.7 83.4 76.3 73.2
F1 Score 28.8 28.6 37.5 18.4 31.4 73.4
samples. In such cases, we did not create additional round
for only one class as this round would have strong influence
over the predictions, i.e., may cause overfitting.
Table 8 shows the fine-tuning method outperformed other
methods only for TM-2: Washington DC. The difference be-
tween the fine-tuning evaluation of Washington DC and oth-
ers is that we were able to create only one round from the
data in the former. Overall, the fine-tuning evaluation is not
as successful as the weighted loss function evaluation, since
we still lost some data while creating rounds.
Related Work
In this work, we addressed location privacy in activity track-
ers using side channel information from publicly shared el-
evation profile, a topic that is related to various pieces of the
literature. In the following, we review some of those studies.
Most location privacy breaches are caused since users do
not know why or how to preserve location privacy. Aktypi,
Nurse, and Goldsmith (2017) developed a tool to examine
possible privacy exposures of users in their social networks
where the data is mostly collected from wearable devices.
Using this tool, the authors aimed to enhance the aware-
ness of information leakage in social networks, particularly
fitness apps in which the data retrieved from wearable de-
vices is shared on social networks. Abdelmoty and Alrayes
(2017) aimed to increase awareness of location privacy on
geo-social networks by surveying 186 users, where 77% of
them indicated they use location-based services often, sev-
eral times a day, and 47% of them reported that they were not
aware that the location-based apps collect and store location
information when users select the private location option.
Moreover, 43% of respondents were not aware that applica-
tion may share the location information with third parties.
Despite the methods employed to preserve location pri-
vacy, several attacks are devised to uncover supposedly pro-
tected locations. Experiments for revealing exact locations
from trajectories with private zones are conducted on Strava
(Hassan, Hussain, and Bates 2018). Researchers found the
exact end points associated with users, even when such users
selected the private zone option when sharing the train-
ing route. In another study, location trajectories of users
are recovered from publicly available aggregated mobility
data obtained from GSM operators (Tu et al. 2018). The at-
tack relies on tracking the regularity—i.e., coming across
the same location trace in the aggregated data regularly—
and uniqueness—i.e., the location trace belongs to a unique
user—of the user mobility traces to recover trajectories.
As our study exemplifies, online social networks lays un-
der the scope of privacy breach risks for users. Zheng et al.
(2015) shows that sharing data which reveals spatiotempo-
ral features of users’ mobility patterns on online social net-
works reveal sensitive information such as home location,
using a different form of data, i.e., multimedia. Rossi et al.
(2015) shows that location-based social networks are vulner-
able also to identity privacy breaches by revealing the iden-
tity of users by observing their mobility patterns.
Several attacks against general location privacy methods
are proposed (Wernke et al. 2014). The homogeneity attack
(Machanavajjhala et al. 2006) is an attack on k-anonymity
to infer data of interest from other shared data. Machanava-
jjhala et al. (2006) illustrated a scenario where an adversary
infers the illness of a target person from available informa-
tion, the zip code, age, etc. The same method can be ap-
plied to infer location data. In location distribution attacks
(Mokbel 2007), the adversary exploits the fact that users are
mostly not uniformly distributed in the location space. An-
other attack (Shokri et al. 2011) utilized the aggregated traf-
fic statistics and environmental context information. The at-
tack scenario includes an adversary who tries to reveal the
possible location of the target by making use of the fact that
the probability of target’s whereabouts is not uniformly dis-
tributed. Map matching methods (Krumm 2007) aim to re-
strict the obfuscated area to a smaller but plausible area by
removing irrelevant areas. Movement boundary attacks were
explored (Ghinita et al. 2009), where the adversary aims to
calculate the movement boundary of a target by chasing the
position queries and updates of the target. After calculating
the boundary, the location of interest, such as home or work
place, is inferred and the irrelevant locations are discarded.
Although we did not directly touch upon preserving the
location privacy in our study, there has been a few related
studies in this space. The fast-growing need of preserving
location privacy over the aforementioned attacks excited
researchers’ attention. Researchers introduce obfuscation
methods such as decreasing the quality of the location by in-
troducing inaccuracy and imprecision (Duckham and Kulik
2005). Additionally, the term k-anonymity is defined as ob-
scuring the location information of individuals with k num-
ber of other individuals within the region (Sweeney 2002;
Gkoulalas-Divanis, Kalnis, and Verykios 2010).
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented new attacks on location privacy
using only elevation profiles publicly available from fitness
trackers. The attacks are categorized into three types: pre-
dicting location by knowing the activity history of the target,
predicting the borough by knowing the city of the target, and
predicting the city of the target without any prior knowledge.
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The key contributions of our work are proving the concept
that hiding the route of a workout and sharing only the el-
evation profile is not sufficient to preserve location privacy,
defining a new attack surface by creating scenarios for pos-
sible threat models, and providing a machine-learning ap-
proach to realize such threat into attacks.
To validate our attacks we created three datasets by col-
lecting data from Strava users, and mining data using Strava
and Google Elevation API. We preprocessed the datasets
by employing Natural Language Processing and Computer
Vision approaches, and then employed classification tech-
niques to predict the location from elevation profiles. En
route, we defined three threat models and evaluated each of
them individually on the different datasets. As a result of the
evaluations, we were able to identify the corresponding lo-
cation of an elevation profile with accuracy between 59.59%
and 95.83%. While a simple defense, such hiding elevation
would work, it might reduce the usability of the fitness appli-
cations. In the future, we will explore compatible defenses.
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